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IN LARGE MARKETS*
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Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of
centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because
couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist
when couples are present. This article’s main result is that a stable matching
exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently
short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with cou-
ples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in
which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of
couples. JEL Codes: C78, D47.
I. Introduction
One of the big twentieth-century transformations of the
American labor market involves the increased labor force partici-
pation of married women, and the consequent growth in the
number of two-career households.1 When a couple needs two
jobs, they face a hard problem of coordination with each other
and with their prospective employers. The search and matching
process for spouses can involve very different timing of searches
and hiring. A couple may be forced to make a decision on a job
offer for one member of the couple before knowing what comple-
mentary jobs may become available for the other or what better
pairs of jobs might become available elsewhere.
*We thank Jin Chen, Rezwan Haque, Fanqi Shi, and especially Dan Barron,
Pete Troyan, and Mengxi Wu for superb research assistance. We are also grateful
to Delong Meng, Assaf Romm, Ran Shorrer, Joel Sobel, and seminar participants
at Calgary, Ecole Polytechnique, Washington University in St. Louis, the ERID
Matching Conference ‘‘Roth and Sotomayor: Twenty Years After’’ at Duke
University, the Coalition Theory Workshop in Marseilles, the EC conference in
San Jose, the 2011 AMES pre-conference at Hanyang, and the NBER Market
Design conference for comments. Elliott Peranson and Greg Keilin provided in-
valuable assistance in obtaining and answering questions about the data used in
this article on behalf of National Matching Services and the Association of
Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers. The National Science
Foundation provided research support.
1. See, for instance, Costa and Kahn (2000) for a description of the trends in the
labor market choices for college-educated couples since World War II.
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An unusually clear view of this problem can be found in the
history of the entry-level labor market for American doctors.
Since the early 1900s, new U.S. medical graduates have been
first employed as ‘‘residents’’ at hospitals, where they work
under the supervision of more senior, licensed doctors. This
market experienced serious problems having to do with the
timing of offers and acceptances, and this unraveling of the
market led to the creation of a centralized clearinghouse in
the 1950s that drew high rates of participation (see Roth 1984,
2003; Roth and Xing 1994 for further details). Medical graduates
were almost all men throughout this period, but by the 1970s
there were enough women graduating from medical school so
that it was not unheard of for two new medical graduates to be
married to each other.2 Many couples felt that the existing clear-
inghouse did not serve them well, and starting in the 1970s, sig-
nificant numbers of these couples began seeking jobs outside of
the clearinghouse.
Roth (1984) argues that this was because the matching algo-
rithm used until then did not allow couples to appropriately ex-
press preferences. That paper shows that, in a market without
couples, the 1950s clearinghouse algorithm is equivalent to the
deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), and
that it produces a stable matching for any reported preferences—
loosely speaking, this is a matching such that there is no pair of
hospital and doctor who want to be matched with each other
rather than accepting the prescribed matching.3 It then observes
that the algorithm often fails to find a stable matching when
there are couples and argues that a main problem of the mech-
anism is that (prior to the 1983 match) it did not allow couples to
report preferences over pairs of positions, one for each member of
the couple. Roth and Peranson (1999) describe the current algo-
rithm, which elicits and uses couples’ preferences over pairs of
positions and has been used by more than 40 centralized clearing-
houses including the American labor market for new doctors, the
National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).4
2. In the 1967–68 academic year, 8% of the graduates of U.S. medical schools
were women. By 1977–78 this fraction had risen to 21%, and by 2008–9 to 49%
(Jonas and Etzel 1998; and see http://www.aamc.org/data/facts/charts
1982to2010.pdf).
3. Section III provides a precise definition of our stability concept.
4. See Roth (2007) for a list of these clearinghouses as well as a survey of the
literature. See also So¨nmez and U¨nver (2009).
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But the problem is difficult even if couples are allowed to
express their preferences over pairs of positions, because there
does not necessarily exist a stable matching in markets with cou-
ples (Roth 1984). However, some matching clearinghouses regu-
larly entertain high rates of participation and produce matchings
that are honored by participants. In fact, it has been reported that
there have only been a few occasions in which a stable matching
was not found over the past decade in several dozen annual mar-
kets (E. Peranson, private communication). Moreover, in the lar-
gest of these markets, the NRMP, Roth and Peranson (1999)
run a number of matching algorithms using submitted pref-
erences from 1993, 1994, and 1995 and find no instance in
which any of these algorithms failed to produce a stable match-
ing. Why do these matching clearinghouses produce stable out-
comes from submitted preferences even though existing theory
suggests that stable matchings may not exist when couples are
present?
This is the puzzle we address, and this article argues that the
answer may have to do with the size of the market. We consider a
sequence of markets indexed by the number of hospitals. Doctors
have preferences, drawn from a distribution over a number of
hospitals, and this number is allowed to grow as the total
number of hospitals grows, but more slowly. These are prefer-
ences after interviews have taken place.5 When the number of
couples grows sufficiently slowly relative to market size, under
some regularity conditions, our main result demonstrates that
the probability that a stable matching exists converges to 1 as
the market size approaches infinity. Moreover, we provide an al-
gorithm that finds a stable matching with a probability that con-
verges to 1 as the market size approaches infinity. We also discuss
incentives for doctors and hospitals to report their preferences
truthfully to the clearinghouse in markets with couples.
Because our theoretical analysis only provides limit results,
we study data on submitted preferences from the centralized
5. The length of doctors preference lists can be expected to grow more slowly
than the number of hospitals because other elements of the environment that limit
the number of interviews are not also growing (e.g., the number of days between
November and February and the time required for interviews remain constant). We
do not model frictions involved in interviewing at different hospitals in this article.
A model with explicit costs of interviewing would be substantially different than the
current framework.
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market for clinical psychologists. In the late 1990s, the market
evolved from a decentralized one (Roth and Xing 1997) to one
employing a centralized clearinghouse, where a key design
issue was whether it would be possible to accommodate the pres-
ence of couples. Keilin (1998) reports that under the old decen-
tralized system, couples had difficulties coordinating their
internship choices. In 1999, clinical psychologists adopted a cen-
tralized clearinghouse using an algorithm based on Roth and
Peranson (1999), in which couples are allowed to express prefer-
ences over hospital pairs. We explore a variation of the Roth-
Peranson procedure to investigate the existence of a stable
matching for years 1999–2007. Using our algorithm, we are
able to find a stable matching with respect to the stated prefer-
ences of participants in all nine years. To investigate whether our
asymptotic arguments provide a guide for realistic market sizes,
we also simulate markets under different assumptions on the
number of couples. We draw preferences for agents from a uni-
form distribution and from a distribution calibrated using data
from the clinical psychology market. Our simulations show that a
stable matching is more likely to be found in large markets. For
example, if the market size, that is, the number of hospital seats,
is at least 2,000 and the number of couples is equal to the square
root of market size, a stable matching exists at least 96% of the
time.
I.A. Related Literature
This article is related to several lines of work. First, it is part
of research in two-sided matching with couples. Existing studies
are mostly negative: Roth (1984) and unpublished work by
Sotomayor show that a stable matching does not necessarily
exist when there are couples, and Ronn (1990) shows that it
may be computationally hard to determine if a stable matching
even exists. Klaus and Klijn (2005) provide a maximal domain of
couple preferences that guarantees the existence of stable match-
ings.6 Although their preference domain has a natural interpret-
ation, our article finds that the submitted preferences of almost
6. Related contributions include Dutta and Masso´ (1997) and Dean, Goemans,
and Immorlica (2006), who investigate the properties of matching models with al-
ternative formulations of couples.
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all couples in our psychology market data violate their condition.7
This empirical fact motivates our appeal to large market
arguments.
The second line of studies related to this article is the grow-
ing literature on large matching markets. Roth and Peranson
(1999) conduct simulations based on data from the NRMP,
which include couples and randomly generated data. They find
suggestive evidence that in large markets, a stable matching is
likely to exist and stable matching mechanisms are difficult to
manipulate. We also examine data from the psychologist market
and demonstrate that a stable matching exists for all years we
have access to data. One of the findings of Roth and Peranson
(1999) is that the opportunities for manipulation vanish in large
markets if doctor preference lists are bounded as market size
grows, but such a result does not hold if each doctor lists all hos-
pitals in her preference list. Moreover, in the market for clinical
psychologists and the NRMP, each applicant can physically inter-
view at a small number of potential employers. These two consid-
erations motivate our theoretical analysis of a model in which
doctor preference lists are allowed to grow, but in a controlled
manner.
Several recent papers have studied incentive issues in
matching models with a large number of agents, following the
setup and techniques in Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) who con-
sider a one-to-one matching model and establish that hospitals
are unlikely to be able to manipulate the doctor-optimal stable
mechanism in a large market.8 Kojima and Pathak (2009) build
on and extend this analysis for a many-to-one market. Although
the use of large market arguments in our article is similar to
these studies, the questions are substantially different. A stable
matching always exists in the model without couples, whereas it
7. Preference restrictions are also used to study incentives for manipulation in
matching markets. The restriction under which incentive compatibility can be es-
tablished is often very strong, as shown by Alcalde and Barbera` (1994), Kesten
(2012), Konishi and U¨nver (2006b), and Kojima (2007) for various kinds of manipu-
lations. Similarly, in the context of resource allocation and school choice
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003), necessary and sufficient conditions for desir-
able properties such as efficiency and incentive compatibility are strict (Ergin 2002;
Kesten 2006; Haeringer and Klijn 2009; Ehlers and Erdil 2010). Another approach
is based on incomplete information (Roth and Rothblum 1999; Ehlers 2004, 2008;
Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Kesten 2010).
8. See also Knuth, Motwani, and Pittel (1990) on the probabilistic analysis of
large matching markets.
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is not guaranteed to exist when couples are present. This article’s
use of large market arguments to establish the existence of a
stable matching is, as far as we know, new in the matching lit-
erature. Our analysis also relaxes some commonly used assump-
tions in the analysis of large matching markets.
Large market arguments have been used in a number of
other recent studies of matching mechanisms (Bulow and Levin
2006; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yasuda 2008; Manea 2009; Che
and Kojima 2010; Kojima and Manea 2010; Budish 2011; Liu and
Pycia 2011; Azevedo and Leshno 2012; Lee 2013). We describe
subsequent work by Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim (2011)
in Section VI. Although the analysis of large markets is rela-
tively new in the matching literature, it has a long tradition
in economics. For example, Roberts and Postlewaite (1976)
and Jackson and Manelli (1997) show that, under some condi-
tions, the Walrasian mechanism is difficult to manipulate in
large exchange economies. Similarly, Gresik and Satterthwaite
(1989) and Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) study
incentive properties of a large class of double auction
mechanisms.
Finally, a couple preference is a particular form of com-
plementarity, and this article can be put in the context of the
larger research program on the role of complementarities in
resource allocation. Complementarities have been identified to
cause nonexistence of desirable solutions in various contexts of
resource allocation. There has been a recent flurry of investi-
gations on complementarities and existence problems in auc-
tion markets (Gul and Stacchetti 2000; Milgrom 2004; Sun and
Yang 2009), general equilibrium with indivisible goods (Gul
and Stacchetti 1999; Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002; Sun
and Yang 2006), and matching markets (Ostrovsky 2008;
Hatfield and Kominers 2009; So¨nmez and U¨nver 2010; Pycia
2012).
The organization of this article is as follows. The next section
describes some features of the market for clinical psychologists
and lays out a series of stylized facts on matching with couples
based on data from this market. Section III defines the model and
describes a simple theory of matching with couples in a finite
market. Section IV introduces the large market assumptions.
Section V states our main results on existence, and Section VI
discusses incentives, robustness, and extensions of our results.
Section VII concludes.
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II. The Market for Internships in Professional
Psychology
II.A. Background
The story of how design has been influenced by the presence
of couples in the NRMP has parallels in the evolution of the
market for internships in professional psychology.9 Roth and
Xing (1997) described this market through the early 1990s.
From the 1970s through the late 1990s, this market operated in
a decentralized fashion (with frequent rule changes), based on a
‘‘uniform notification day’’ system in which offers were given to
internship applicants over the telephone within a specific time
frame (e.g., a four-hour period on the second Monday in
February). All acceptances and rejections of offers occurred
during this period. Keilin (2000, 281) described the system as
‘‘problematic, subject to bottlenecks and gridlock, encouraging
the violation of guidelines, and resulting in less-than-desirable
outcomes for participants.’’
In 1998–99, the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and
Internship Centers (APPIC) switched to a system in which appli-
cants and internship sites were matched by computer. A major
debate in this decision was whether a centralized system could
handle the presence of couples. In the old, decentralized scheme it
was challenging for couples to coordinate their internship
choices. Keilin (1998) reports that one partner could be put in
the position of having to make an immediate decision about an
offer without knowing the status of the other partner. Following
the reforms of the NRMP, a new scheme that allowed couples to
jointly express their preferences was adopted.
With the permission of the APPIC, the organization that
runs the matching process, National Matching Services, provided
us with an anonymized data set of the stated rank order lists of
single doctors, couples, and hospitals and hospital capacities for
the first nine years of the centralized system. Because of privacy
concerns, the APPIC data set does not include any demographic
information on applicants and only limited identifying informa-
tion on programs.
9. To be clear, we concentrate on the match run by the APPIC for predoctoral
internships in psychology, which involves clinical, counseling, and school psych-
ologists. (This is distinct from the postdoctoral match in neuropsychology.)
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II.B. Stylized Facts
This section identifies some stylized facts from the internship
market for professional psychologists. Although we do not have as
detailed data from the NRMP, we also mention related facts from
that market when appropriate using information from the
NRMP’s annual reports.
The data are the stated preferences of market participants,
so their interpretation may require some caution. There are at
least two parts to the process by which market participants form
their preferences: (1) they determine which applicants or intern-
ship programs may be attractive, and participate in interviews;
and (2) after interviewing, they determine their rank ordering
over the applicants or internship programs they have inter-
viewed. The model and the data do not allow us to say much
about the first stage of the application process. In determining
where to interview, applicants probably factor in the costs of tra-
veling to interviews, the program’s reputation, and a host of other
factors. Programs consider, among other things, the applicant’s
recommendation letters and suitability for their program in
deciding whom to interview. Once market participants have
learned about each other, they must come up with their rank
ordering. For the empirical analysis in this section, we abstract
away from the initial phase of mutual decisions of whom to inter-
view, and our interpretation is that the data reflect the prefer-
ences formed after interviews. This, and the fact that participants
only seem to rank those with whom they have had interviews,
likely accounts for the relatively short rank order lists.
Even with this interpretation, the reported post-interview
preferences may be manipulations of the true post-interview pref-
erences of market participants because truth-telling is not a dom-
inant strategy for all market participants. However, there are at
least two reasons that treating submitted preferences as true
preferences may not be an unrealistic approximation. First, as
noted in Section VI.A, the organizers of the APPIC match empha-
size repeatedly that market participants should declare their
preferences truthfully. Second, in our working paper (Kojima,
Pathak, and Roth 2010) we provide assumptions under which
truth-telling is an approximate equilibrium in large markets.
Table I presents some summary statistics on the market. On
average, per year, there are 3,010 single applicants and 19 pairs
of applicants who participate as couples. In early years, there
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were just under 3,000 applicants, but the number of applicants
has increased slightly in the most recent years. The number of
applicants who participate as couples has remained relatively
small, varying between 28 and 44 (i.e., between 14 and 22 cou-
ples) which is about 1% of all applicants.10 On the surface, the
small number of couples may appear surprising, but this number
represents cases where both couple members look for jobs in pro-
fessional psychology in the same year. If couple members wish to
work in different fields, or even in the same field but in different
years, each couple member simply applies as a single applicant.
In the NRMP, from 1992 to 2009, on average 4.4% of applicants
participated as couples, with slightly more couples participating
in the most recent years (NRMP 2009).
FACT 1. Applicants who participate as couples constitute a small
fraction of all participating applicants.
TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MARKET FOR CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
Total Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Panel A. Length of rank order list (ROL)
Single applicants 3,010 7.6 1.0 4.0 7.1 10.4 73.1
Couples 19 81.2 7.3 29.4 52.3 115.0 249.9
Distinct programs ranked 10.2 2.0 6.4 9.9 13.0 20.9
Programs 1,094 16.7 1.0 7.6 14.3 23.8 80.9
Panel B: Program capacities
Capacity 2,721 2.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 21.4
Panel C: Geographic similarity of preferences
Single applicants
# Regions ranked 2.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.1 9.3
Couples
# Regions ranked 3.9 1.0 2.5 3.9 4.9 6.9
Fraction of ROL where both
members rank same region
73.4% 29.7% 47.1% 78.2% 99.3% 100.0%
Notes. This table reports descriptive information from the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and
Internship Centers match for 1999–2007. Single applicants’ rank order lists consist of a ranking over
hospitals, whereas couples indicate rankings over program pairs. Distinct programs ranked are the set of
distinct programs ranked by each couple member. Programs include only those that have positive cap-
acity. There are 11 regions, corresponding to the first digit of U.S. ZIP codes and Canada.
10. As the example in the next section shows, even one couple in the market may
lead to nonexistence of a stable matching.
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Panel A of Table 1 shows the length of the rank order lists for
applicants and programs. On average across years, single appli-
cants rank between seven and eight programs. Because there are
1,094 programs on average, this means that the typical applicant
ranks less than 1% of all possible programs. Even at the extreme,
the length of the longest single applicant’s rank order list is about
6.7% of all possible programs. In the NRMP, the length of the
applicant preference list is about seven to nine programs, which
would be roughly 0.3% of all possible programs.11 This may not be
surprising because an applicant typically ranks a program only
after she interviews at the program, and each applicant receives
and can travel to only a limited number of interviews.
For couples, each entry in the rank order list is a pair of
programs (or being unmatched). The typical rank order list of
couples averages 81 program pairs. However, the rank order
list of a couple has entries for both members, so there are many
duplicate programs. When we consider the number of distinct
programs ranked by a couple, it is similar to the number
ranked by single applicants: on average, there are about 10 dis-
tinct programs listed by each couple member. At the extreme in
our data set, the maximum number of distinct programs ranked
by a couple member is 1.9% of all programs.
Of course, the fact that a doctor has a short preference list
does not mean they prefer to leave the profession if they cannot
obtain one of their stated choices. Given our interpretation of
preferences as those formed after interviews, the short rank
order list means doctors only interview at a fraction of possible
hospitals and they may have a complete ranking over these op-
tions. In the event that they are unassigned, they either partici-
pate in the after-market in which they can learn about additional
hospitals or postpone their training for a year, as is commonly
done by doing a research year to strengthen one’s credentials.
FACT 2. The length of the rank order lists of applicants who are
single or couples is small relative to the number of possible
programs.
The next issue we examine is the distribution of applicant pref-
erences. In Figure I, we explore the popularity of programs in our
data. For each program, we compute the total number of students
11. This information is not available separately for single applicants and those
who participate as couples in the NRMP.
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who rank that program as their top choice. We order programs by
this number, with the program with the highest number of top
choices on the left and programs that no one ranks as their top
choice on the right. Figure I shows the distribution of popularity
for 2003. In this year, the most popular program was ranked as
the top choice by 19 applicants, and 189 programs are not ranked
as a top choice by any applicant. The other years of our data set
display a similar pattern. Averaged across all years, the most
popular program is ranked as a top choice by 24 applicants, and
about 208 programs are not ranked as a top choice by anyone. The
fraction of applicants ranking the most popular program as their
first choice is only 0.8%. (Recall that these are preferences stated
after interviews have been conducted, so it does not preclude the
possibility that there are popular programs that receive many
applications but only interview a small subset of applicants.)
FACT 3. The most popular programs are ranked as a top choice by
a small number of applicants.
The only identifying information we have on programs are geo-
graphic regions where they are located. The 11 geographic re-
gions in our data set are 10 regions in the United States, each
of which corresponds to the first digit of the zip code of the pro-
gram’s location, and one region for all of Canada. Most programs
are concentrated on the West Coast and in the Northeast. In
Table I, we report the number of distinct regions ranked by ap-
plicants. Half of single applicants rank at most two regions.
Couples, on the other hand, tend to rank slightly more regions.
For a given couple rank order list, we also compute the frac-
tion of entries on their submitted list that have both jobs in the
same region. On average, 73% of a couple’s rank order list is for
programs in the same region.
FACT 4. A pair of internship programs ranked by doctors who
participate as a couple tend to be in the same region.
In the psychology market, there are about 1,100 internship pro-
grams. The average capacity is about 2.5 seats, and more than
three-quarters of programs have 3 or fewer spots. The total cap-
acity of internship programs is smaller than the total number of
applicants who participate, which implies that each year there
will be unmatched applicants. This is also true in the NRMP,
where the number of positions per applicant ranges from 0.75
to 0.90 over the period 1995–2009 (NRMP 2009).
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Even though there are more applicants than programs, in the
APPIC match, there are a sizable number of programs that are
unfilled at the end of the regular match. According to the APPIC’s
statistics, during 1999–2007, on average 17% of programs had
unfilled positions. In the NRMP, a similar proportion of programs
had unfilled seats. In 2009, for instance, 12% of programs had
unfilled positions.12
FACT 5. Even though there are more applicants than positions,
many programs still have unfilled positions at the end of the
centralized match.
II.C. Stable Matchings in the Market for Psychologists
We next investigate whether a stable matching exists in the
market for psychologists.13 Roughly speaking, this is a matching
such that there is no pair of hospital and applicant who prefer
each other to the prescribed matching.14 We use a variant of the
procedure by Roth and Peranson (1999) to compute a stable
12. In practice, to place these remaining applicants, both markets have a decen-
tralized aftermarket where positions are filled. In this market, applicants can com-
municate and informally interview with places they did not initially consider, but
under very short time limits. In recent years there have been proposals to eliminate
these processes completely (see, e.g., Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program
[SOAP] described at http://www.nrmp.org/soap.pdf, accessed on October 22, 2010.)
The model in this article is only about the main match and does not model this
decentralized aftermarket, though understanding how it may interact with the
main round is an interesting question for future work.
13. The model we analyze in this article allows employers to have preferences
over sets of applicants provided that the preferences are responsive. Our data on
program rank order lists consist only of preferences over individual applicants. We
do not know, for instance, whether a program prefers their first- and fourth-ranked
applicants over their second- and third-ranked applicants. To compute a stable
matching in the market for psychologists, it is necessary to specify how comparisons
between individual applicants relate to comparisons between sets of applicants. For
the empirical computation, when comparing sets of applicants D1 and D2, we
assume thatD1 is more preferred toD2 if the highest individually ranked applicant
in D1 who is not in D2 is preferred to the highest individual ranked applicant in D2
who is not in D1. This would imply that the first and fourth ranked applicant are
preferred over the second and third ranked applicant. (We take advantage of the
more flexible formulation of preferences over sets that we employ, compared to that
used in practice.)
14. Section III provides a precise definition of our stability concept.
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matching.15 For each of the nine years of data, the first column of
Table II shows that a stable matching exists in the market with
couples with respect to submitted preferences.16
FACT 6. A stable matching with respect to submitted preferences
exists in all nine years in the market for psychologists.
We also compare the assignment of single applicants at the
stable matching we find in a market with couples to their as-
signment in the applicant-optimal stable matching in a market
without couples in Online Appendix Table A1. Adding couples
to the market in principle could affect the assignment received
by many single applicants, in practice it has little effect. This
can be seen by comparing the overall distribution of choice
received for single applicants in a stable matching in markets
without couples and with couples. Moreover, Online Appendix
Table A2 reports the exact number of single applicants who
receive a less preferred assignment in the market with couples.
On average, there are 19 couples or 38 applicants who partici-
pate as couples in the market and because of their presence,
only 63, or 2% of single applicants obtain a lower choice. This
corresponds to about three single applicants obtaining a differ-
ent assignment per couple.
FACT 7. Across stable matchings, most single applicants obtain
the same position in the market without couples as in the
market with couples.
15. Our variation has a different sequencing of applications from single appli-
cants and couples than that described in Roth and Peranson (1999). That paper
gives some evidence that these sequencing decisions have little effect on the success
of the procedure.
16. We focus on a particular stable matching in the market with couples, be-
cause we are unable to compute the entire set of stable matchings. There may be a
reason to suspect that this set is small. In Online Appendix Table A3, we compute
stable matchings in the market without couples and find that very few applicants
and programs have different assignments across the applicant-optimal and pro-
gram-optimal stable matchings. Moreover, there is evidence from real-life applica-
tions of the college admissions model without couples that the size of the stable set is
small: see, for example, Roth and Peranson (1999), table 9, which examines the
market for thoracic surgeons, and Pathak and So¨nmez (2008), p. 1645, on Boston
school choice.
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III. A Simple Theory of Matching with Couples
III.A. Model
A matching market consists of hospitals, doctors, and their
preferences. Let H be the set of hospitals and ; be the outside
option for doctors. Define ~H ¼ H [ f;g. S is the set of single doc-
tors, and C is the set of couples of doctors. Each couple is denoted
by c= (f,m), where f and m denote the first and second members
of couple c, respectively. When we need to refer to the members
of a specific couple c, we sometimes write ðfc,mcÞ. Let
F ¼ ff ðf ,mÞ 2 C for some mg and M ¼ fm ðf ,mÞ 2 C for some f g
be the sets of first and second members that form couples. Let
D ¼ S [ F [M be the set of doctors.
Each single doctor s 2 S has a preference relation Rs over ~H.
We assume that preferences are strict: if hRsh0 and h0Rsh, then
h ¼ h0. We write hPsh0 if hRsh0 and h 6¼ h0. If hPs;, we say that
hospital h is acceptable to single doctor s.
Each couple c 2 C has a preference relation Rc over ~H  ~H,
pairs of hospitals (and being unmatched). We assume that prefer-
ences of couples are strict with Pc denoting the asymmetric part of
Rc. If ðh,h0ÞPcð;, ;Þ, then we say that pair ðh,h0Þ is acceptable to
couple c. We say that hospital h is listed by Rc if there exists h
0 2 ~H
(so h0 may be ;) such that either ðh,h0ÞPcð;, ;Þ or ðh0,hÞPcð;, ;Þ.
Each hospital h 2 H has a preference relation over 2D, all
possible subsets of doctors. We assume preferences of hospitals
are strict. Let h 2 H and h be a positive integer. We say that
preference relation h is responsive with capacity h if it ranks
a doctor independently of her colleagues and disprefers any set of
doctors exceeding capacity h to being unmatched (see Online
Appendix A.1 for a formal definition). We follow much of the
matching literature and assume that hospital preferences are re-
sponsive throughout the article. LetRh be the corresponding pref-
erence list of hospital h, which is the preference relation over
individual doctors and ;. We write dPhd0 if dRhd0 and d 6¼ d0.
We say that doctor d is acceptable to hospital h if dPh;. We
write H¼ ðhÞh2H. We refer to a matching market  as a tuple
ðH,S,C, ðhÞh2H, ðRiÞi2S[CÞ.
We proceed to define our stability concept in markets with
couples. The descriptions are necessarily somewhat more
involved than those in the existing literature because we allow
for capacities of hospitals larger than one (we elaborate on this
issue shortly). First, it is convenient to introduce the concept of
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hospital choices over permissible sets of doctors. For any set of
doctors and couples D0  D [ C, define
AðD0Þ ¼ fD00  Dj8s 2 S, if s 2 D00 then s 2 D0,
8c 2 C, if ffc,mcg  D00, then ðfc,mcÞ 2 D0,
if fc 2 D00 and mc 62 D00, then fc 2 D0,
if fc 62 D00 and mc 2 D00, then mc 2 D0g:
In words, AðD0Þ is the collection of sets of doctors available for a
hospital to employ when doctors (or couples of doctors) D0 are
applying to it. Underlying this definition is the distinction be-
tween applications by individual couple members and those by
couples as a whole. For example, if ðf ,mÞ 2 D0 \ C but f ,m=2D0,
then the couple is happy to be matched to the hospital if and
only if both members are employed together, whereas if
ðf ,mÞ=2D0 but ff ,mg  D0, then the couple is happy to have one
member matched to the hospital but not together.
For any set D0  D [ C, define the choice of hospital h given
D0, ChhðD0Þ, to be the set such that
. ChhðD0Þ 2 AðD0Þ,
. ChhðD0Þ h D00 for all D00 2 AðD0Þ.
The choice ChhðD0Þ is the most preferred subset of doctors
among those in D0 such that each couple is either chosen or not
chosen together if they apply as a couple.17
A matching specifies which doctors are matched to which
hospitals (if any). Formally, a matching m is a function defined
on the set ~H [ S [ C, such that ðhÞ  D for every hospital
h, ðsÞ 2 ~H for every single doctor s, and ðcÞ 2 ~H  ~H for every
couple c where
. ðsÞ ¼ h if and only if s 2 ðhÞ and
. ðcÞ ¼ ðh,h0Þ if and only if fc 2 ðhÞ and mc 2 ðh0Þ.
When there are only single doctors in D0, the set AðD0Þ is simply
the set of subsets of D0. Hence the choice ChhðD0Þ is the subset of
D0 that is the most preferred by h. This is the standard definition
of ChhðÞ in markets without couples (see Roth and Sotomayor
17. This formulation of hospital preferences involving couples is more general
than currently implemented in practice, where hospitals’ preferences are elicited
only over individual members of a couple.
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1990 for example), and hence the current definition is a general-
ization of the concept to markets with couples.
A matching is individually rational if no player can be made
better off by unilaterally rejecting some of the existing partners
(see Online Appendix A.1 for a formal definition). We define dif-
ferent cases of how the relevant small coalitions can block a
matching as follows:
(1) A pair of a single doctor s and a hospital h 2 H is a block
of  if hPsðsÞ and s 2 ChhððhÞ [ sÞ.18
(2) (a) A coalition ðc,h,h0Þ 2 C ~H  ~H of a couple and two
hospitals,19 where h 6¼ h0, is a block of m if
. ðh,h0ÞPcðcÞ,
. fc 2 ChhððhÞ [ fcÞ, and
. mc 2 Chh0 ððh0Þ [mcÞ.20
(b) A pair ðc,hÞ 2 CH of a couple and a hospital is a
block of  if
. ðh,hÞPcðcÞ and
. ffc,mcg  ChhððhÞ [ cÞ.
A matching m is stable if it is individually rational and there
is no block of m.
1. Discussion of the Solution Concepts. Models of matching
with couples where hospitals have multiple positions are a par-
ticular form of many-to-many matching because each couple may
seek two positions.21 Various definitions of stability have been
proposed for many-to-many matching, which differ based on the
assumptions on what blocking coalitions are allowed (Sotomayor
1999, 2004; Echenique and Oviedo 2006; Konishi and U¨nver
18. We denote a singleton set {x} simply by x whenever there is no confusion.
19. Note that the definition of a blocking coalition of a couple and two hospitals
includes the case in which only one member of the couple changes hospitals, so it
might be thought of as being a coalition of a couple and one hospital, with the hos-
pital whose employee doesn’t move being a passive participant in the blocking
coalition.
20. For the purpose of this definition, we adopt a notational convention thatCh;
is an identity function, so the condition d 2 Ch;ðð;Þ [ dÞ is satisfied for any  and
d 2 D.
21. More precisely, Hatfield and Kojima (2008, 2010) point out that the model is
subsumed by a many-to-many generalization of the matching model with contracts
as analyzed by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
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2006a). Consequently, there are multiple possible stability con-
cepts in matching with couples. The present definition of stability
allows us to stay as close to the most commonly used pairwise
stability as possible, by assuming away deviations involving large
groups. Ruling out large coalitions appears to be reasonable be-
cause identifying and organizing large groups of agents may be
difficult.
It is nevertheless important to understand whether our ana-
lysis is sensitive to a particular definition of stability. To address
this issue, in Online Appendix A.2 we present an alternative def-
inition of stability that allows for larger coalitions to block a
matching. We show that the results of this article hold under
that definition as well.
Most studies in matching with couples have focused on the
case in which every hospital has capacity 1.22 Following the
standard definition of stability in such models (see Klaus and
Klijn 2005, for instance), we say that a matching  is unit-cap-
acity stable if
(1)  is individually rational,
(2) there exists no single doctor-hospital pair s,h such that
hPsðsÞ and sPhðhÞ, and
(3) there exists no coalition by a couple c ¼ ðf ,mÞ 2 C and
hospitals (or being unmatched) h,h0 2 ~H with h 6¼ h0
such that ðh,h0ÞPcðcÞ, fRhðhÞ, and mRh0ðh0Þ.23
Our concept of stability is equivalent to the unit-capacity sta-
bility as defined already if every hospital has responsive prefer-
ences with capacity 1. To see this, first observe that condition (3) of
unit-capacity stability is equivalent to the nonexistence of a block
as defined in condition (2a) of our stability concept. Moreover, con-
dition (2b) of our stability concept is irrelevant when each hospital
has capacity 1 because a hospital with capacity 1 never prefers to
match with two members of a couple. Finally, the remaining con-
ditions for unit-capacity stability have direct counterparts in our
22. Some papers consider multiple positions of hospitals but treat a hospital
with capacity larger than 1 as multiple hospitals with capacity 1 each. This ap-
proach is customary and usually innocuous when there exists no couple because
most stability concepts are known to coincide in that setting (Roth 1985). However,
the approach has a consequence if couples exist because it leads to a particular
stability concept. A different modeling approach is pursued by McDermid and
Manlove (2009).
23. We adopt the notational convention that dR;d0 for any d,d0 2 D [ ;.
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definition of stability. Thus the stability concept employed in this
article is a generalization of the standard concept to the case
where hospitals have multiple positions.
Also note that our stability concept is equivalent to the stand-
ard definition of (pairwise) stability when there exist no couples.
More specifically, condition (2) of our stability concept is irrele-
vant if couples are not present, and condition (1) is equivalent to
the nonexistence of a blocking pair which, together with individ-
ual rationality, defines stability in markets without couples.
III.B. The Existence Problem with Couples
We illustrate how the existence of couples poses problems in
the theory of two sided matching. To understand the role of cou-
ples, however, it is useful to start by considering a matching with-
out couples. In that context, the (doctor-proposing) deferred
acceptance algorithm always produces a stable matching (Gale
and Shapley 1962).
ALGORITHM 1 (DOCTOR-PROPOSING DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHM)
Input: a matching market ðH,S, ðhÞh2H, ðRsÞs2SÞ without
couples.
Step 1: Each single doctor applies to her first choice hospital.
Each hospital rejects its least preferred doctor in excess of its
capacity and all unacceptable doctors among those who
applied to it, keeping the rest of the doctors temporarily (so
doctors not rejected at this step may be rejected in later steps).
In general, Step t: Each doctor who was rejected in Step (t –1)
applies to her next highest choice (if any). Each hospital con-
siders these doctors and doctors who are temporarily held
from the previous step together, and rejects the least pre-
ferred doctors in excess of its capacity and all unacceptable
doctors, keeping the rest of the doctors temporarily (so doc-
tors not rejected at this step may be rejected in later steps).
The algorithm terminates at a step where no doctor is re-
jected. The algorithm always terminates in a finite number of
steps. At that point, all tentative matchings become final. Gale
and Shapley (1962) show that for any given market without
couples, the matching produced by the deferred acceptance
algorithm is stable. Furthermore, they show that it is the
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doctor-optimal stable matching, the stable matching that is
weakly preferred to any other stable matching by all doctors.
By contrast, stable matchings do not necessarily exist even when
there is only one couple in the market (shown by Roth 1984 and
an unpublished work by Sotomayor). This fact is illustrated in the
following example, based on Klaus and Klijn (2005).
EXAMPLE 1. Let there be a single doctor s and a couple c = (f,m) as
well as two hospitals h1 and h2, each with capacity 1. Suppose
the acceptable matches for each agent, in order of preference,
are given by:
Rc : ðh1,h2Þ Rs : h1,h2
h1 : f , s h2 : s,m:
We illustrate that there is no stable matching in this market,
by considering each possible matching.
1. Suppose ðcÞ ¼ ðh1,h2Þ. Then single doctor s is un-
matched. Thus single doctor s and hospital h2 block 
because s prefers h2 to her match ðsÞ ¼ ; and h2 pre-
fers s to its match ðh2Þ ¼ m.
2. Suppose ðcÞ ¼ ð;, ;Þ.
(a) If ðsÞ ¼ h1, then ðc,h1,h2Þ blocks  because couple
c prefers ðh1,h2Þ to their match ðcÞ ¼ ð;, ;Þ, hos-
pital h1 prefers f to its match ðh1Þ ¼ s, and hos-
pital h2 prefers m to its match ðh2Þ ¼ ;.
(b) If ðsÞ ¼ h2 or ðsÞ ¼ ;, then ðs,h1Þ blocks  be-
cause single doctor s prefers his first-choice hos-
pital h1 to both hospital h2 and ; whereas h1
prefers s to its match ðh1Þ ¼ ;.
Klaus and Klijn (2005) identify a sufficient condition to guarantee
the existence of a stable matching called weak responsiveness. A
couple’s preferences are said to be responsive if an improvement
in one member’s assignment is an improvement for the couple.
Preferences are said to be weakly responsive if the requirement
applies to all acceptable positions.24 The preferences of couples in
Example 1 do not satisfy this condition. If, for instance, the cou-
ple’s preferences are ðh1,h2Þ, ðh1, ;Þ, ð;,h2Þ, ð;, ;Þ, in order of pref-
erence, then it satisfies responsiveness and a stable matching
exists. Klaus and Klijn (2005) write that ‘‘responsiveness
24. See Klaus, Klijn, and Nakamura (2009) for formal definition.
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essentially excludes complementarities in couples’ preferences.’’
They showed that:
(1) if the preferences of every couple are weakly respon-
sive, then there exists a stable matching.
(2) if there is at least one couple whose preferences violate
weak responsiveness while satisfying a condition called
‘‘restricted strict unemployment aversion,’’ then there
exists a preference profile of other agents such that
preferences of all other couples are weakly responsive
but there exists no stable matching.
Their second result says that the class of weakly responsive
preferences is the ‘‘maximal domain’’ of preferences. That is, it is
the weakest possible condition that can be imposed on individual
couples’ preferences that guarantees the existence of stable
matchings.25
There seem to be many situations in which couple prefer-
ences violate weak responsiveness. One reason may be geo-
graphic, as stated as Fact 4: both programs ranked as a pair by
a couple tend to be in the same geographic region. For example,
the first choice of a couple of medical residents may be two resi-
dency programs in Boston and the second may be two programs in
Los Angeles; one member working in Boston and the other work-
ing in Los Angeles could be unacceptable because these two cities
are too far away from each other. The coordinator of the APPIC
matching program writes in Keilin (1998, 602) that ‘‘most couples
want to coordinate their internship placements, particularly with
regard to geographic location.’’ This suggests that violation of
weak responsiveness due to geographic preferences is one of the
representative features of couple preferences.26
To further study this question empirically, we analyze the
data on the stated preferences of couples from the APPIC. Stated
preferences of couples may not be their true preferences because
the truth-telling is not necessarily their dominant strategy.
However, there are reasons that couples may not want to misrep-
resent their preferences. First, it may be complicated for a couple
to determine a profitable deviation. Moreover, truth-telling may
25. Hatfield and Kominers (2009) show that the substitutes condition is a max-
imal domain in the absence of restricted strict unemployment aversion.
26. For an investigation of decision making among couples in the market for
new Ph.D. economists, see Helppie and Murray-Close (2010).
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be focal, especially since clearinghouse organizers explicitly en-
courage participants to report their preferences truthfully.
Finally, Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010) provide conditions
under which truth-telling is an approximate equilibrium when
there are large numbers of market participants. During years
for which we have data (1999–2007), preferences of only 1
couple out of 167 satisfy weak responsiveness. Thus the data sug-
gest, in light of the results of Klaus and Klijn (2005), that it is
virtually impossible to guarantee the existence of a stable match-
ing in such markets with couples based on a domain restriction of
preferences.
However, the fact that the preferences of the overwhelming
majority (166 out of 167) of couples violate weak responsiveness
does not mean that a stable matching does not exist in the psych-
ologist market. Stable matchings have been found in many labor
markets despite the presence of couples, and as we described in
Section II.C, we find a stable match for each of the nine years of
the psychology market for which we have data. This motivates our
desire to understand what market features enable the existence of
stable matchings most of the time, when the known sufficient
conditions on couples’ preferences do not guarantee existence.
III.C. Sequential Couples Algorithm
The original deferred acceptance algorithm does not incorpor-
ate applications by couples. We consider an extension of the algo-
rithm, which we call the sequential couples algorithm. Although we
defer a formal definition to Online Appendix A.3 for expositional
simplicity, we offer an informal description as follows.
(1) run a deferred acceptance algorithm for a submarket
composed of all hospitals and single doctors, but with-
out couples;
(2) one by one, place couples by allowing each couple to
apply to pairs of hospitals in order of their preferences
(possibly displacing some doctors from their tentative
matches); and
(3) one by one, place singles who were displaced by couples
by allowing each of them to apply to a hospital in order
of her preferences.
We say that the sequential couples algorithm succeeds if
there is no instance in the algorithm in which an application is
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made to a hospital where an application has previously been
made by a member (or both members) of a couple except for the
couple who is currently applying. Otherwise, we declare a failure
and terminate the algorithm.
Failure of the sequential couples algorithm does not mean that
a stable matching does not exist. Therefore, in practice, a matching
clearinghouse would be unlikely to declare failure when the se-
quential couples algorithm fails, but would instead consider
some procedure to try to assign the remaining couples and find a
stable matching. This is the main idea behind the Roth-Peranson
algorithm (Roth and Peranson 1999), which is the basis for the
mechanism used in the NRMP, APPIC, and other labor markets.
If the sequential couples algorithm succeeds, then the Roth-
Peranson algorithm produces thematching reached by thesequen-
tial couples algorithm. However, the sequential couples algorithm
and the Roth-Peranson algorithm are different in two aspects.27
First, where the sequential couples algorithm fails, the Roth-
Peranson algorithm proceeds and tries to find a stable matching.
The algorithm identifies blocking pairs, eliminating instances of
instability one by one, in a manner similar to Roth and Vande
Vate (1990). Note that since a stable matching does not necessar-
ily exist in markets with couples, the Roth-Peranson algorithm
could cycle without terminating. However, the algorithm forces
termination of a cycle and proceeds with processing other appli-
cants. This sometimes ultimately results in a stable matching,
and sometimes no stable matching is found. Second, in the
Roth-Peranson algorithm, when a couple is added to the market
with single doctors, any single doctor who is displaced by the
couple is placed before another couple is added. By contrast, the
sequential couples algorithm holds any displaced single doctor
without letting her apply, until it processes applications by all
couples.28
The reason we focus on this simplified procedure is that the
success of the sequential couples algorithm turns out to be
27. A complete description of the Roth-Peranson algorithm, specifically how the
algorithm terminates cycles and proceeds with processing, is not publicly available,
but a more detailed description than the one provided here is offered by Roth and
Peranson (1999), and a flowchart of the algorithm appears in Roth (2013).
28. As we will point out subsequently, our result also holds if we follow the
sequencing of doctors as in the Roth-Peranson algorithm. We chose the current
definition of the sequential couples algorithm for expositional simplicity.
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sufficient to verify the existence of a stable matching (the proof is
in Online Appendix A.3).
LEMMA 1. If the sequential couples algorithm succeeds, then the
resulting matching is stable.
To illustrate the main idea of Lemma 1, we consider how the
sequential couples algorithm proceeds for the market in
Example 1. In step 1 of the algorithm, we run the doctor-propos-
ing deferred acceptance algorithm in the submarket without cou-
ples. Single doctor s proposes to hospital h1 and is assigned there.
Then in step 2, we let couple c apply to their top choice ðh1,h2Þ.
Couple member f is preferred to s by h1, and couple member m is
preferred to a vacant position by h2. Thus f and m are tentatively
assigned to h1 and h2, respectively while s is rejected. Then in
step 3, we let s apply to her next highest choice. In this case, she
applies to hospital h2, where a couple member m has applied and
been assigned before. At this point we terminate the algorithm
and declare that it has failed.
To see why declaring a failure of the sequential couples algo-
rithm is useful, suppose that we hypothetically continue the al-
gorithm by allowing h2 to reject m because h2 prefers s to m. Then
the couple prefers being unassigned rather than having only f be
matched to h1, so doctor f would like to withdraw his assignment
from hospital h1. Suppose we terminate the algorithm at this
point once f becomes unmatched. Then the resulting matching
assigns no doctor to h1 and s to h2. This matching is unstable
because doctor s can block with hospital h1. On the other hand,
if we continue the algorithm further by allowing s to match with
h1, then the resulting matching is identical to the one obtained at
the end of step 1 of the sequential couples algorithm. This sug-
gests that reasonable algorithms would cycle without terminat-
ing in this market.
The idea of declaring failure of the sequential couples algo-
rithm is to avoid a situation like the foregoing example and turns
out to be a useful criterion for judging whether the algorithm
produces a stable matching. Of course, the algorithm sometimes
fails even if there exists a stable matching, so its success is only a
sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching. What is
remarkable is that looking at this particular sufficient condition
turns out to be enough for establishing that a stable matching
exists with a high probability in the environment we study here.
Moreover, there is a sense in which it is necessary to use an
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algorithm that finds a stable matching only in some instances,
rather than one that always finds a stable matching whenever it
exists. Ronn (1990) shows that the problem of determining
whether a market with couples has a stable matching is compu-
tationally hard (NP-complete). The result suggests that it may be
inevitable to employ an approach that does not always find a
stable matching like our sequential couples algorithm.
Example 1 illustrates that the sequential couples algorithm
does not necessarily succeed and suggests that markets of any
finite size would allow such a failure. We instead consider a
large market environment with a random component in the pref-
erences of the market participants. Our contribution is to demon-
strate that, with high probability, the sequential couples algorithm
succeeds, and hence a stable matching exists in this environment.
IV. Large Markets
IV.A. Random Markets
We have seen that a stable matching does not necessarily
exist in a finite matching market with couples. To investigate
how often a stable matching exists in large markets, we introduce
the following random environment. A random market is a tuple
~ ¼ ðH,S,C, H , k,P, Þ, where k is a positive integer,
P ¼ fpdðÞgd2D is a collection of probability distributions for each
doctor d on H, and r is a function that maps two preferences over
~H to a preference list for couples (explained shortly). Each
random market induces a market by randomly generating pref-
erences of doctors as follows:
Preferences for Single Doctors: For each single doctor
s 2 S,
Step 1: Select a hospital h with probability psðhÞ. List this
hospital as the top-ranked hospital of single doctor s.
In general,
Step t  k: Select a hospital h with probability psðhÞ. Repeat
until a hospital is drawn that has not been previously
drawn in steps 1 through t – 1 or every hospital h such
that psðhÞ > 0 has already been drawn. List this hospital
as the tth most preferred hospital of single doctor s.
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In other words, to construct the preference list, we draw hos-
pitals repeatedly without replacement (at most) k times according
to distribution psðÞ. Single doctor s finds these k hospitals accept-
able, and all other hospitals unacceptable. For example, if psðÞ is
the uniform distribution on H, then the preference list is drawn
from the uniform distribution over the set of all preference lists of
length k.
Preferences for Doctors who are Couples: Couples’ pref-
erences are formed by drawing preferences, Rf and Rm, for each
doctor in the couple c ¼ ðf ,mÞ. Rf and Rm are constructed from
distributions pf ðÞ and pmðÞ following the process used to generate
preferences for a single doctor already described.
To construct the preference list for the couple c ¼ ðf ,mÞ,
define ðRf ,RmÞ to be a preference of the couple with the following
restriction: if ðh1,h2Þ is acceptable according to ðRf ,RmÞ, then
h1Rf; and h2Rm;. This is the only restriction we place on r.
Preferences for Hospitals: Each hospital h has a respon-
sive preference relation defined over sets of doctors h such that
all doctors are acceptable.
1. Discussion of Modeling Choices. The model assumes that
doctors’ preferences are drawn independently from one another
in a statistical sense. However, doctors’ preferences are not ne-
cessarily drawn from identical distributions and hence can be
substantially different from one another. This modeling assump-
tion can capture various possibilities for doctor preferences that
may be important empirically. For example, the assumption
allows a situation in which some popular hospitals are listed
with higher probability than others by many doctors. It also
allows preference distributions where doctors from different re-
gions prefer programs from their own region to those outside of
their region. Moreover, the assumption also allows for couples to
have systematically different views on desirability of hospitals
than single doctors. Allowing the doctors’ preferences to differ
in this way makes the assumption more general than the identi-
cal preference distribution assumption in Immorlica and
Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2009), and Manea (2009).
In Section VI.C, we discuss the assumption in more detail and
examine ways it can be relaxed.
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The function  is a mapping that outputs a preference rela-
tion for each couple ðf ,mÞ given the pair of preferences Rf and Rm
over ~H. One could interpret ðRf ,RmÞ as describing the outcome of
household bargaining when preferences of the members are Rf
and Rm, respectively. For example, the function r can represent a
process in which any pair of hospitals that are too far away from
each other is declared unacceptable, which seems to be consistent
with the observed rank order lists of couples described earlier. We
remain agnostic about  except that a hospital pair ðh,h0Þ is
weakly acceptable for the couple under ðRf ,RmÞ only when h
and h0 are listed under Rf and Rm, respectively. In other words,
no hospital appears in the preference list of a couple unless it is
considered by the relevant member of the couple. Note that this,
of course, does not impose that the couples preferences are weakly
responsive. All our results are unchanged if we allow the function
r to vary across different couples, but we model a common func-
tion r for all couples for expositional simplicity. Moreover, our
results also hold when couples draw their preferences jointly
from some distribution over pairs of hospitals.
Some NRMP participants who participate as couples are
advised to form preferences by first forming individual rank
order lists after interviewing with programs. Then, these lists
serve as an input into the joint ranking of the couple. For in-
stance, medical students who are couples at the University of
Kansas Medical School are suggested to make a list of all possible
program pair combinations from both individual rank order lists
by computing the difference between the ranking number of the
program on each individual’s rank order list and trying to min-
imize this difference in their joint rank order list. This would be
one example of a  function.29
29. The details on this advice are available online at http://medicine.kumc.
edu/school-of-medicine/osa/residency-information/couples-match.html (accessed
July 31, 2013). The clearinghouse for new doctors in Scotland only allows couple
members to submit individual rank order lists, in contrast to the model we analyze
here. In that context, their mechanism combines these lists into a preference over
pairs for the couple using their individual lists and a table of positions that are
determined to be geographically compatible by the mechanism. See the discussion
of the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme at http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/pbiro/
applications/uk_sfas.html (accessed July 31, 2013).
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The probabilistic structure we place on doctor preferences is
unneeded for hospital preferences. Rather, hospital preferences
can be arbitrary except for two important restrictions. First, hos-
pital preferences are assumed to be responsive, as in much of the
literature on two-sided matching. The labor market clearing-
houses that motivate our study impose this restriction by eliciting
preferences over individual doctors.
The second important assumption on hospital preferences
is that hospitals find all doctors acceptable. We make this
assumption so that there are enough hospitals that can actu-
ally hire doctors in large markets. At first glance, this as-
sumption seems violated in the data from the market for
clinical psychologists as no program submits a rank order
list of all doctors (i.e., as seen in Table I, the average
number of doctors listed in a hospital’s preference list is
16.7 in our APPIC data). However, the programs rank most
doctors who have ranked them, and an equivalent assumption
is that each hospital finds acceptable only doctors who list
that hospital, for example, because hospitals (and doctors)
will only rank doctors (and hospitals) they have interviewed.
Clearly the existence result follows under this alternative as-
sumption, because any stable matching at the original prefer-
ence profile is also stable under the modified preference
profile. The results also follow, at additional notational com-
plexity, in a model where at least a constant fraction of hos-
pitals find all doctors acceptable.
IV.B. Regular Sequence of Random Markets
To analyze limit behavior of the matching market as the
market becomes large, we consider a sequence of markets of dif-
ferent sizes. A sequence of random markets is denoted by
ð ~1, ~2, . . .Þ, where ~n ¼ ðHn,Sn,Cn, Hn , kn,Pn, nÞ is a random
market in which Hnj j ¼ n is the number of hospitals. Consider the
following regularity conditions.
DEFINITION 1. A sequence of random markets ð ~1, ~2, . . .Þ is regu-
lar if there exist  > 0, a < 12 , b > 0, r  1, and  < 1	2ar such
that for all sufficiently large n,
1. Snj j  n; Cnj j  bna,
2. kn   logðnÞ,
3. pdðhÞpdðh0Þ  r for all doctors d in D
n and hospitals h,h0 in Hn.
MATCHINGWITH COUPLES 29
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Condition 1 requires that the number of single doctors does not
grow much faster than the number of hospitals. Moreover, cou-
ples do not grow at the same rate as the number of hospitals and
instead grow at the slower rate of OðnaÞ where a < 12. This condi-
tion is motivated by Fact 1 that the number of couples is small
compared with the number of hospitals or single doctors. Note
that the assumption also implies that the total number of appli-
cants Snj j þ Cnj j is of order at most n and is consistent with either
more doctors than hospitals or fewer. Condition 2 assumes that
the length of doctors’ preference lists does not grow too fast when
the number of market participants grows.30 This assumption is
motivated by Fact 2 that the length of rank order lists of doctors is
small relative to the number of programs. Allowing the length of
doctor’s preference lists to vary does not change any of our results
as long as each doctor’s rank order list is no longer than  logðnÞ.
Condition 3 requires that the popularity of different hospitals (as
measured by the probability of being listed by doctors as accept-
able) does not vary too much, as suggested by Fact 3.
V. Existence of Stable Matchings
As seen in Example 1, a stable matching does not necessarily
exist when some doctors are couples. However, there is a sense in
which a stable matching is likely to exist if the market is large as
formalized by our main result:
THEOREM 1. Suppose that ð ~1, ~2, . . .Þ is a regular sequence of
random markets. Then the probability that there exists a
stable matching in the market induced by ~n converges to 1
as the number of hospitals n approaches infinity.
We defer the formal proof to Online Appendix A.3 and describe
the argument here. Our proof involves analysis of the sequential
couples algorithm in a regular sequence of random markets. By
Lemma 1, we know that a stable matching exists whenever the
algorithm succeeds. Our proof strategy is to show that the prob-
ability that the sequential couples algorithm succeeds converges
to 1 as the market size approaches infinity.
30. In Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010), we considered the case where the
doctor rank order list is bounded. We thank the referees for suggesting that we
relax this assumption to allow for a growing rank order list length.
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Suppose that there are a large number of hospitals in the
market. Given our assumptions on the distribution of couples’
preferences, different couples are likely to prefer different pairs
of hospitals. Hence, in step 2 of the algorithm, members of two
distinct couples are unlikely to apply to the same hospital. In such
an instance, this step of the algorithm tentatively places couples
without failure. Given that, it suffices to show that the single
doctors displaced in steps 2 and 3 (if any) are likely to be placed
without applying to a hospital where a couple has applied. To
show this, first we demonstrate that if the market is large, then
it is a high-probability event that there are a large number of
hospitals with vacant positions at the end of step 2 (even
though there could be more applicants than positions: see
Proposition 4.2 in the Online Appendix).31 Then, any single
doctor is much more likely to apply to a hospital with a vacant
position than to one of the hospitals that has already received an
application by a couple member. Since every doctor is acceptable
to any hospital by assumption, a doctor is accepted whenever an
application is made to a vacant position. With high probability
the algorithm places all the single doctors in step 3, resulting in a
success. Together with Lemma 1, we conclude that if the market
is large enough, then the probability that there exists no stable
matching can be made arbitrarily small. This completes the
argument.
As explained in Section III.C, the sequential couples algo-
rithm is similar to but slightly different from the Roth-
Peranson algorithm in the order of which doctors apply to hos-
pitals. However, it is clear from the proof that the argument can
be modified for the Roth-Peranson algorithm. Therefore, we have
the following result as a corollary.
COROLLARY 1. Suppose that ð ~1, ~2, . . .Þ is a regular sequence of
random markets. Then the probability that the Roth-
Peranson algorithm produces a stable matching in the
market induced by ~n converges to 1 as the number of hos-
pitals n approaches infinity.
31. Note that the feature that there are many hospitals with vacant positions is
consistent with Fact 5, which states that there are many resident programs with
vacant positions in practical matching markets.
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VI. Incentives, Robustness, and Extensions
VI.A. Incentives
The previous section establishes our main result on the ex-
istence of a stable matching with respect to reported preferences
that follow certain distributional assumptions. In practice, how-
ever, preferences are private information of market participants,
and the matching clearinghouse needs to elicit this information.
Thus a natural question is whether there is a mechanism that
induces participants to report true preferences and produces a
stable matching with respect to the true preferences.
One motivation for studying this question comes from the
market for psychologists. The following advice is given to partici-
pants by clearinghouse organizers:32
IMPORTANT: There is only one correct ‘‘strategy’’ for
developing your Rank Order List: simply list your
sites based on your true preferences, without consid-
eration for where you believe you might be ranked by
them. List the site that you want most as your #1
choice, followed by your next most-preferred site, and
so on.
The previous paragraph is so important that we
are going to repeat it: simply list your sites based
on your true preferences.
Similar recommendations are made in other labor markets with
couples. Below is the advice for participants offered by the
NRMP.33
Programs should be ranked in sequence, according to
the applicant’s true preferences. . . . It is highly un-
likely that either applicants or programs will be
able to influence the outcome of the Match in their
favor by submitting a list that differs from their true
preferences.
32. ‘‘FAQ for Internship Applicants’’ on the APPIC website, http://www.appic.
org/match/faqs/applicants/rank-order-lists#q2 (accessed July 30, 2013).
33. ‘‘Rank Order Lists’’ on the NRMP website, http://www.nrmp.org/fellow/
rank_order.html (accessed November 11, 2009).
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In these quotes, market participants are advised to report their
true preferences to the matching authority. This advice may have
been based on the incentive properties of stable mechanisms in
markets without couples. For instance, without couples, in the
doctor proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, truth-telling is
a dominant strategy for doctors. However, in markets with cou-
ples, this is no longer the case.
In the working paper version (Kojima, Pathak, and Roth
2010), we consider the issue of incentives after participants
have conducted their interviews. The question we study is
whether given a particular mechanism which finds a stable
matching with high probability, do applicants have an incentive
to truthfully rank the programs that interviewed them? At a first
glance, a positive result seems elusive: there exists no mechanism
that is stable and strategy-proof even without couples. However,
we provide conditions under which truth-telling is an approxi-
mate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a large regular market.
VI.B. Robustness
Theorem 1 is an asymptotic result, and the probability that a
stable matching exists is not guaranteed to reach 1 in any finite
market. On the other hand, any particular market has only finite
numbers of market participants. In this section, we examine the
relevance of the asymptotic result to the applications which mo-
tivate our analysis.
1. Speed of Convergence. The first issue is the order (speed) of
convergence. Our model is quite general in terms of a number of
parameters, making it elusive to establish an appealing result
about the order of convergence.
However, the proof of the theorem allows us to evaluate the
convergence probability for each given sequence of random mar-
kets, and this enables us to obtain a sharp result for special cases.
In Online Appendix A.3.1, we show that if the number of couples
is bounded and the length of each doctor’s preference list is
bounded along the sequence of random markets (that is, a= 0
and kn  k for some constant k in Definition 1), then the probabil-
ity that there is no stable matching approaches 0 at least with the
rate of convergence O

1
n

.
The key to this observation is inequality (19) in Online
Appendix A.3, which provides a lower bound of the probability
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that a sequential couples algorithm successfully finds a stable
matching. As explained there, the convergence order result is
obtained through a bounding exercise of this inequality for the
special case. Note however that inequality (19) itself holds gen-
erally for any choice of parameters as long as our regularity and
thickness conditions hold. Therefore, one can evaluate inequality
(19) to obtain an order of convergence more generally. In that
sense, our analysis may shed light on the speed of convergence
given any relevant information about the sequence of random
markets.
There is an important sense in which our bounds do not
exactly match the bounds required for finite markets like
APPIC with 2,000 participants largely because of constants in
expression (19). To see whether the qualitative insights from
the theory are relevant for actual market sizes, we turn to simu-
lation evidence shortly.
2. Proportion of Market Participants Who Are Couples. Our
model made a number of assumptions, some of which could be
relaxed. Perhaps the strongest assumption in our analysis relates
to the growth rate of couples. Empirically, there are few couples
in actual markets, but this fact does not directly imply the appro-
priate growth rate for a sequence of markets. Subsequent work by
Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim (2011) studies a model with
similar features. They state that a stable matching exists (with a
slightly different notion of stability) when couples are allowed to
grow at rate n1	 for  > 0. Their work differs from ours in that
they examine the implications of considering a particular se-
quence of proposals by couples and find the order that is least
likely to generate existence problems.34
3. Length of Doctor Rank Order Lists. As stated in Definition
1, our result holds even when the number kn of hospitals that a
doctor finds acceptable grows without a bound as the market size
34. See also Biro´ and Irving (2010) for simulations and analysis related to a
special case of the couples problem that arises in a medical labor market in
Scotland, in which hospitals rank all applicants (including the individual members
of couples) according to a common exam score. Biro´ and Irving show that the prob-
lem of determining if a stable matching exists remains computationally hard even
in this special case, but simulations show that the probability of the set of stable
matchings being empty is low when the proportion of couples is low.
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n grows, as long as its growth speed is slow enough. More specif-
ically, our proof goes through if kn   logðnÞ where  < 1	2a16 :
Our result is a limit one based on probability bounds. As such,
our asymptotic prediction is not directly applicable to any finite
economy. That being said, we can use the above expression to
make some qualitative predictions. To do so, note that the upper
bound of  is decreasing in a and l: Recall that a is the parameter
representing the growth speed of couples, and l is the upper bound
of the ratio of the number of doctors to the number of hospitals.
Thus the comparative statics here suggests that asymptotic exist-
ence holds for a faster growth speed of doctor preference list
length when the number of couples grows more slowly and the
number of doctors are smaller. The caveat of this argument is, of
course, that our result provides only a lower bound of the exist-
ence probability, so our exercise here cannot be conclusive.
4. Performance of Sequential Couples Algorithm in APPIC.
We found a stable matching in the APPIC data set for all nine
years using the algorithm described in Section B.2 in the Online
Appendix. This algorithm is a variant of the sequential couples
algorithm (SCA) with particular cycling and termination rules.
Here we investigate whether the intuition expressed from the
formal analysis of the SCA provides insight into existence for
the clinical psychology market. Recall that we define the SCA
as succeeding if there is no instance in the algorithm in which
an application is made to a hospital where an application has
previously been made by a member (or both members) of a
couple except for the couple who is currently applying. Under
this definition, failure of the SCA does not imply that a stable
matching does not exist. Our formal results focused on this def-
inition because it was sufficient to derive formal properties in the
market with couples.
To examine how thesequential couples algorithm performs for
the APPIC market, in column (2) of Table II we report on whether
there is an ordering of couples for which a stable matching is found
using the SCA. The definition of failure used in our proof provides
only a lower bound, and for Table II we investigate a stronger def-
inition of failure that still works for our purposes. We declare fail-
ure when a single doctor or couple applies to a program where a
couple member is assigned and this applicant is more preferred
than the couple member. This definition is preferred because
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declaring failure when an applicant applies to a program where a
couple is assigned is relatively common in the APPIC data set, even
though it suffices for our formal argument and a stable matching
continues to be found even when it occurs. If the SCA fails under
this slightly stronger definition of failure, it also fails under the
definition used in our proof. Even though the SCA by itself is a
relatively naive procedure, remarkably, a simple application of
the algorithm together with the appropriate sequencing of couples
finds a stable matching in six out of nine years.35
The fact that SCA finds a stable matching two thirds of the
time even in a finite market suggests that analyzing its properties
may provide intuition for why stable matchings are found in prac-
tice. The key phenomena are doctor’s short rank order lists, the
small number of couples, and the limited overlap between pref-
erences in doctor’s rank order lists. Indeed, in two of the six suc-
cessful years, 2003 and 2005, it is never the case that an applicant
even applies to a program where a couple is assigned as shown in
column (3).36 In another two of those successful years, there is
limited overlap in couple’s rank order lists. In two years (1999
and 2001) a couple does not apply to a program in the SCA where
another couple is assigned, as shown in column (4).
5. Simulations Varying Market Size and Number of Couples.
Data from the APPIC market does not provide guidance on how
the likelihood of existence changes with market size and the
number of couples in the market. We next turn to simulations
of markets under different assumptions on size, the number of
couples, and the distribution of preferences. Figure II reports the
fraction of markets where we find a stable matching for a one-to-
one matching market with preferences drawn from a uniform
distribution. We set single doctors’ rank order lists to have
length 10 and couples’ joint rank order lists to have length of
about 40 on average and focus on varying the fraction of couples
35. Because the ordering of couples is arbitrary and we do not want our conclu-
sions to be influenced by a particular ordering, in these columns we investigate
what happens for 1,000 random permutations of the ordering of couples and declare
success if we find a stable matching for at least one of those orderings.
36. This is consistent with the definition of failure that is sufficient for our
statement of Lemma 1.
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in the market.37 (Online Appendix Section B.1 precisely describes
how we construct market primitives for each market size.)
Each line in Figure II corresponds a particular number of
couples in the market as we vary market size. For a given
number of couples, as market size increases, the fraction of simu-
lations for which we find a stable matching increases. For in-
stance, with 20 couples, we always find a stable matching
under each simulation once the market size is greater than
1,000. For an economy like the NRMP, where over the past
decade about 600 applicants are couples (corresponding to 1,200
couple members) and the market size averages 26,000, the prob-
ability a stable matching is found is roughly 95%. Finally, the
thicker shaded line in Figure II shows the fraction of markets
with a stable matching when the number of couples is equal toﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
, corresponding to an upper bound of the growth rate in
Theorem 1. Once the market size is at least 2,000, a stable match-
ing exists in at least 96% of the markets.
Even though Figure I suggests that doctor preferences are
widely distributed across programs, it is possible that the uniform
distribution does not adequately capture the distribution of
doctor preferences in real markets. In Figure III, we use the
APPIC data set to calibrate the distribution for applicant and
program preferences. We fit models of doctor and program
demand for one another and simulate an economy based on
these estimates. (The precise details on how we generate prefer-
ences are in the Online Appendix Section B.1.) The pattern of how
existence changes with market size and the number of couples is
similar between markets with the APPIC-calibrated distribution
and the uniform distribution. For a given number of couples, the
likelihood of finding a stable matching weakly increases with
market size for the 100 markets we simulate.
Overall, Figures II and III suggests that the existence prob-
ability increases with market size for a given number of couples.
Market sizes and couples fractions like those observed in APPIC
or the NRMP display a high likelihood of stable matching exist-
ence in our simulation.
37. Roth and Peranson (1999) report simulations varying the length of doctor
rank order lists in markets without couples.
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VI.C. Extensions
This article focuses on regular sequences of random markets
and makes use of each condition in our arguments. A notable
implication of the model is that, if the market is large, then it is
a high-probability event that there are a large number of hos-
pitals with vacant positions, even if there are more applicants
than positions (for formal statements, see Proposition 2 in the
Online Appendix). Note that the feature that there are many hos-
pitals with vacant positions is consistent with Fact 5.
1. Distribution of Preferences. Our model assumed certain
regularities in the way that random markets grow. In particular,
there are some nontrivial restrictions on doctors’ preference dis-
tributions. Of course, some distributional assumptions are
needed in large market analysis: For instance, Immorlica and
Mahdian (2005) offer an example where preference distributions
violate a regularity assumption and their result fails even with-
out couples.
One of the modeling assumptions in the preceding text is that
doctors’ preferences are drawn independently from one another
in a statistical sense. However, doctors’ preferences are not ne-
cessarily drawn from identical distributions and hence can be
substantially different from one another. As discussed in
Section IV.A, this modeling assumption can capture various pos-
sibilities for doctor preferences that may be important empiric-
ally. These include doctors from a particular region ranking
own-region programs higher than programs outside of their
region. Also, the model allows single doctors and couple members
to draw their rankings from different distributions.
In fact, statistical independence was introduced for expos-
itional simplicity, but we do not even need this assumption. On
the contrary, the result can be generalized to environments with
preference correlation and even aggregate shocks in other vari-
ables, such as supply of doctors and hospitals’ job openings. To see
this point, consider a model in which there is a state variable
s that is drawn randomly from a certain distribution. For each
realization of the state variable , there is a sequence of random
markets ð ~1ðÞ, ~2ðÞ, . . .Þ. We assume that ð ~1ðÞ, ~2ðÞ, . . .Þ satis-
fies the regularity condition for each , but allow ~nðÞ to be dif-
ferent for different realizations of . Doctor preferences are
conditionally independent given , but this framework allows
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for doctor preferences to be correlated through their dependence
on the common shock represented by the state variable. Clearly,
our result generalizes to this model: the probability that a stable
matching exists conditional on state variable s converge to 1 as
the market size approaches infinity for each s by our previous
analysis, and the unconditional probability of existence is
merely a weighted average of these conditional probabilities.
This model allows for correlations in doctor preferences as
well as other variables that may be useful in applications. For
instance, s could represent the state of the economy in different
regions of the country, which then determines how many pos-
itions are open in each hospital and which hospitals are popular.
In that case, the realization of s determines the preference dis-
tributions from which doctors draw their preference list in such a
way that hospitals in regions with positive wage shocks are popu-
lar and those in regions with negative wage shocks are unpopu-
lar. Similarly, s could represent changes in funding of medical
residency training by Medicare. Medicare is a major source of
funding for residency training, which is subject to heated
debate and many reform proposals (Rich et al. 2002). Thus the
Medicare funding level may be seen as a relevant state variable,
which affects parameters such as the number of advertised pos-
itions in hospitals and the content of (and hence the popularity of)
hospital residency programs.
2. Other Complementarities. As mentioned in Section I, a
couple preference is a particular form of complementarity, and
this article can be put in the context of the research program on
the role of complementarities in resource allocation. Examples
could include groups of workers who care about externalities
and firms that need a team of workers with complementary
skills, among others. Given our analysis, a natural question is
whether our asymptotic existence result of stable matchings con-
tinues to hold in the presence of these and other forms of
complementarities.
To study this issue, consider a model of firm-worker match-
ing, where each firm can hire up to k workers and each worker
can work for at most one firm, where k is a constant. Suppose that
a small fraction of firms draw nonsubstitutable preferences over
workers, whereas others draw substitutable preferences that sat-
isfy the law of aggregate demand. Moreover, assume regularity of
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the sequence of random markets similar to Definition 1. The
couple matching is the case with  ¼ 2, where we relabel firms
and workers as doctors and hospitals, respectively (think of each
couple as a firm needing to hire two positions).
Our asymptotic existence result extends to the model already
described. To see why, consider a variant of the sequential cou-
ples algorithm, which places firms with substitutable preferences
first and then places firms with nonsubstitutable preferences one
by one. This algorithm succeeds if no firms apply to workers
where other firms with nonsubstitutable preferences are already
tentatively placed. As in the case of couples, as long as the frac-
tion of firms with nonsubstitutable preferences shrinks suffi-
ciently fast, each firm has a capacity bounded by a constant k,
and each firm finds up to a constant number of workers to be
acceptable, then the probability of a success can be shown to con-
verge to 1 by the same argument as the one for Theorem 1. In fact,
Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim (2011) consider a similar
model with complementarities and present a convergence result
(see their Theorem 5).
VII. Conclusion
This article contributes toward understanding the conse-
quences of the complementarities caused by couples in matching
markets, a phenomenon that has grown in importance as dual-
career households have become a significant part of the labor
force. We investigate this issue by studying couples in centralized
labor market clearinghouses. Even though a stable matching
does not necessarily exist when couples are present, as long as
the complementarities caused by couples are small in an appro-
priate way, our main result is that the market has a stable match-
ing with a high probability. More broadly, our study suggests that
not only does large market analysis help understand economies
with indivisibilities, it also generates new kinds of results in mar-
kets with complementarities, which have been challenging for
existing approaches.
We have complemented our theoretical results with analysis
of data from the market for psychologists. The stylized facts from
the data motivate some of the modeling assumptions. In every year
of the data we are able to find a stable matching with respect to the
stated preferences. Our simulations show that a stable matching is
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more likely to be found in large markets. Because the mechanism
we analyze is similar to the actual procedures used in markets
such as the NRMP for U.S. medical residents, our results help
explain why some mechanisms in practice provide a stable
matching with high probability despite the presence of couples.
There are a number of additional questions motivated by this
article. One question is whether stability itself is the reason for
the enduring success of the NRMP and postdoctoral psychology
market. Field and laboratory evidence suggests that stability is
responsible for the persistence of certain centralized clearing-
houses (Roth 1991; Kagel and Roth 2000). Within the context of
couples, however, an alternative may simply be to consider a
weaker approximate notion of stability, such as a requirement
that the number of blocking coalitions be small. Under our as-
sumptions it is obvious that there always exists a matching that
is approximately stable in that sense.38 What is more remarkable
and interesting is that the markets we study have exactly stable
matchings, and our analysis provides conditions for this fact.
Another question involves the interpretation of preferences.
As we have emphasized, the analysis we undertake is after ap-
plicants interview for positions. This is perhaps the major reason
why applicants’ rank order lists are short in a large market.
A richer, but substantially different, model could consider a
two-stage game where participants have imperfect information
about their preferences and first decide where to interview. This
type of analysis could provide a way to endogenize the short rank
order lists of applicants. While interesting, we expect this sort of
analysis to first focus on the decision problem of where to apply,
before adding the complications of how to participate in a match-
ing market with couples.39 Loosely speaking, we would expect
that in such a model, most applicants would apply to many pos-
itions, and many hospitals would have more applicants than they
can interview, while some applicants might receive more
38. To see this point, consider a matching that is stable in the submarket com-
posed of hospitals and single doctors only while keeping all couples unmatched.
Clearly the number of coalitions that may block this matching is at most the sum of
the lengths of the rank order lists over all couples, which is small in large markets
under our maintained assumptions.
39. Related to this, another issue is to examine whether couples may have an
incentive to manipulate by pretending to be singles or vice versa (as in Klaus, Klijn,
and Masso 2007), or even whether a dual-career joint location problem encourages
or discourages doctors from marrying other doctors (see Hurder 2013).
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interview invitations than they can or feel a need to accept, so
that a good deal of sorting among doctors and hospitals would
take place even before interviews were conducted.
A further topic for research is how decentralized markets
might be organized to handle couples better. For instance,
Niederle and Roth (2009a, 2009b) study how the rules regarding
exploding offers influence market outcomes. The issues here
would involve the formal and informal rules by which couples
search for two positions and by which offers and responses are
made, so as to increase the efficiency of the market in finding
matches when some applicants are looking for pairs of positions.
In summary, labor markets in which the pool of applicants
includes two-career households have proved challenging to study
even as they have become more common and have demanded adap-
tation in labor market rules and institutions. Although many open
questions remain, the results of the present article suggest that
some of the potential problems that couples and market designers
face may become more tractable in large markets.
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and NBER
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Supplementary Material
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE
online (qje.oxfordjournals.org).
References
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Atila, and Tayfun So¨nmez, ‘‘School Choice: A Mechanism Design
Approach,’’ American Economic Review, 93 (2003), 729–747.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda, ‘‘Expanding Choice in
School Choice,’’ (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke Research Paper No.
20, 2008).
Alcalde, Jose´, and Salvador Barbera`, ‘‘Top Dominance and the Possibility of
Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems,’’ Economic Theory,
4 (1994), 417–435.
Ashlagi, Itai, Mark Braverman, and Avinatan Hassidim, ‘‘Stability in Large
Matching Markets with Complementarities,’’ (unpublished mimeo, MIT
Sloan School, 2011).
Azevedo, Eduardo M., and Jacob D. Leshno, ‘‘A Supply and Demand Framework
for Two-Sided Matching Markets,’’ (unpublished manuscript, Wharton,
2012).
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS44
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Bikhchandani, S., and J. M. Ostroy, ‘‘The Package Assignment Model,’’ Journal of
Economic Theory, 107, no. 2 (2002), 377–406.
Biro´, P., and R. W. Irving, ‘‘Stable Matching with Couples—An Empirical Study,’’
(Technical Report TR-2010-319, University of Glasgow, 2010).
Budish, Eric, ‘‘The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes,’’ Journal of Political
Economy, 119, no. 6 (2011), 1061–1103.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Jonathan Levin, ‘‘Matching and Price Competition,’’
American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 652–668.
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Fuhito Kojima, ‘‘Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic
Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms,’’ Econometrica (2010), 1625–1672.
Costa, Dora, and Matthew Kahn, ‘‘Power Couples: Changes in the Locational
Choice of the College Educated, 1940–1990,’’ Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115 (2000), 1287–1315.
Dean, Brian C., Michael X. Goemans, and N. Immorlica, ‘‘The Unsplittable Stable
Marriage Problem,’’ Proceedings of the 4th IFIP International Conference on
Theoretical Computer Science 2006, pp. 65–76.
Dutta, B., and J. Masso´, ‘‘Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have
Preferences over Colleagues,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 75 (1997),
464–475.
Echenique, Federico, and Jorge Oviedo, ‘‘A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many
Matching,’’ Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 233–273.
Ehlers, Lars, ‘‘In Search of Advice for Participants in Matching Markets Which
Use the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm,’’ Games and Economic Behavior, 48
(2004), 249–270.
———, ‘‘Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets,’’ Mathematics of Operations
Research, 33 (2008), 327–335.
Ehlers, Lars, and Aytek Erdil, ‘‘Efficient Assignment Respecting Priorities,’’
Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2010), 1269–1282.
Erdil, Aytek, and Haluk Ergin, ‘‘What’s the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving
Efficiency in School Choice,’’ American Economic Review, 98 (2008), 669–689.
Ergin, Haluk, ‘‘Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities,’’
Econometrica, 70 (2002), 2489–2498.
Gale, David, and Lloyd S. Shapley, ‘‘College Admissions and the Stability of
Marriage,’’ American Mathematical Monthly, 69 (1962), 9–15.
Gresik, Thomas, and Mark Satterthwaite, ‘‘The Rate at Which a Simple Market
Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases,’’ Journal of
Economic Theory, 48 (1989), 304–332.
Gul, Faruk, and Ennio Stacchetti, ‘‘Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross
Substitutes,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 87 (1999), 95–124.
———, ‘‘The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities,’’ Journal of
Economic Theory, 92 (2000), 66–95.
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Flip Klijn, ‘‘Constrained School Choice,’’ Journal of
Economic Theory, 144 (2009), 1921–1947.
Hatfield, John William, and Fuhito Kojima, ‘‘Matching with Contracts:
Comment,’’ American Economic Review, 98 (2008), 1189–1194.
———, ‘‘Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts,’’ Journal of
Economic Theory, 145 (2010), 1703–1723.
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers, ‘‘Many-to-Many Matching with
Contracts,’’ (Mimeo: Stanford Graduate School of Business and Becker
Friedman Institute, 2009).
Hatfield, John William, and Paul Milgrom, ‘‘Matching with Contracts,’’ American
Economic Review, 95 (2005), 913–935.
Helppie, Brooke, and Marta Murray-Close, ‘‘Moving Out or Moving Up? New
Economists Sacrifice Job Opportunities for Proximity to Significant Others
– and Vice Versa,’’ (Working paper, University of Michigan, 2010).
Hurder, Stephanie, ‘‘An Integrated Model of Occupation Choice, Spouse Choice,
and Family Labor Supply,’’ Harvard University, Department of Economics,
2013, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/hurder/papers/
SHurderJMP.pdf.
Immorlica, Nicole, and Mohammad Mahdian, ‘‘Marriage, Honesty, and Stability,’’
SODA Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
MATCHINGWITH COUPLES 45
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Algorithms (Philadelphia: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
2005), pp. 53–62.
Jackson, Matthew O., and Alejandro M. Manelli, ‘‘Approximately Competitive
Equilibria in Large Finite Economies,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 77
(1997), 354–376.
Jonas, Harry S., and Sylvia I. Etzel, ‘‘Undergraduate Medical Education,’’
Journal of the American Medical Association, 260 (1998), 1063–1071.
Kagel, John, and Alvin E. Roth, ‘‘The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching
Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Field
Experiment,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 201–235.
Keilin, W. Gregory, ‘‘Internship Selection 30 Years Later: An Overview of the
APPIC Matching Program,’’ Professional Psychology: Research and
Practice, 29 (1998), 599–603.
———, ‘‘Internship Selection in 1999: Was the Association of Psychology
Postdoctoral and Internship Centers’ Match a Success?,’’ Professional
Psychology: Research and Pratice, 31 (2000), 281–287.
Kesten, Onur, ‘‘On Two Competing Mechanisms for Priority-Based Allocation
Problems,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 127 (2006), 155–171.
———, ‘‘School Choice with Consent,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125
(2010), 1297–1348.
———, ‘‘On Two Kinds of Manipulation for School Choice Problems,’’ Economic
Theory, 51 (2012), 677–693.
Klaus, Bettina, and Flip Klijn, ‘‘Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,’’
Journal of Economic Theory, 121 (2005), 75–106.
Klaus, Bettina, Flip Klijn, and Jordi Masso, ‘‘Some Things Couples Always
Wanted to Know about Stable Matchings (But Were Afraid to Ask),’’
Review of Economic Design, 11 (2007), 175–184.
Klaus, Bettina, Flip Klijn, and Toshifumi Nakamura, ‘‘Corrigendum: Stable
Matchings and Preferences of Couples,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 144
(2009), 2227–2233.
Knuth, Donald E., Rajeev Motwani, and Boris Pittel, ‘‘Stable Husbands,’’ Random
Structures and Algorithms, 1 (1990), 1–14.
Kojima, Fuhito, ‘‘When Can Manipulations Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching
Markets? Maximal Domain Results,’’ Contributions to Theoretical
Economics, 7 (2007), article 32.
Kojima, Fuhito, and Mihai Manea, ‘‘Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial
Mechanism,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2010), 106–123.
Kojima, Fuhito, and Parag A. Pathak, ‘‘Incentives and Stability in Large
Two-Sided Matching Markets,’’ American Economic Review, 99 (2009),
608–627.
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, ‘‘Matching with Couples:
Stability and Incentives in Large Markets,’’ (NBER Working Paper 16028,
2010).
Konishi, Hideo, and M. Utku U¨nver, ‘‘Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many
Matching Problems,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 129 (2006a), 57–80.
———, ‘‘Games of Capacity Manipulation in the Hospital-Intern Market,’’ Social
Choice and Welfare, 27 (2006b), 3–24.
Lee, SangMok, ‘‘Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets,’’
(unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 2013).
Liu, Qingmin, and Marek Pycia, ‘‘Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in
Large Markets,’’ (UCLA working paper, 2011).
Manea, M., ‘‘Asymptotic Ordinal Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship,’’
Theoretical Economics, 4, no. 2 (2009), 165–197.
McDermid, Eric J., and David Manlove, ‘‘Keeping Partners Together: Algorithmic
Results for the Hospitals/Resident Problem with Couples,’’ Journal of
Combinatorial Optimization, 19 (2009), 279–303.
Milgrom, Paul R. Putting Auction Theory to Work (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, ‘‘The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on
Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices,’’ in Labor Market
Intermediation, David Autor, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2009a), 235–271.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS46
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
———, ‘‘Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market
Performance,’’ American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1 (2009b),
199–219.
NRMP (National Resident Matching Program), ‘‘Results and Data: 2009 Main
Residency Match,’’ 2009, available at http://www.nrmp.org/data/resultsand
data2009.pdf (accessed March 15, 2010).
Ostrovsky, Michael, ‘‘Stability in Supply Chain Networks,’’ American Economic
Review, 98 (2008), 897–923.
Pathak, Parag A., and Tayfun So¨nmez, ‘‘Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and
Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism,’’ American Economic
Review, 98 (2008), 1636–1652.
Pycia, Marek, ‘‘Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition
Formation,’’ Econometrica, 80 (2012), 323–362.
Rich, E. C., M. Liebow, M. Srinivasan, D. Parish, J. O. Wolliscroft, O. Fein, and
R. Blaser, ‘‘Medicare Financing of Graduate Medical Education,’’ Journal of
General Internal Medicine, 17, no. 4 (2002), 283–292.
Roberts, Donald John, and Andrew Postlewaite, ‘‘The Incentives for Price-
Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies,’’ Econometrica, 44 (1976),
115–127.
Ronn, E., ‘‘NP-Complete Stable Matching Problems,’’ Journal of Algorithms, 11,
no. 2 (1990), 285–304.
Roth, Alvin E., ‘‘The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and
Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,’’ Journal of Political Economy,
92 (1984), 991–1016.
———, ‘‘The College Admission Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage
Problem,’’ Journal of Economic Theory, 36 (1985), 277–288.
———, ‘‘A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets:
Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.,’’ American
Economic Review, 81 (1991), 415–440.
———, ‘‘The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match,’’ Journal of the
American Medical Association, 289 (2003), 909–912.
———, ‘‘Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice and Open
Questions,’’ International Journal of Game Theory, 36 (2007), 537–569.
———, ‘‘What Have We Learned from Market Design?,’’ in The Handbook of
Market Design, Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman, eds.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Roth, Alvin E., and Elliott Peranson, ‘‘The Redesign of the Matching Market for
American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,’’
American Economic Review, 89 (1999), 748–780.
Roth, Alvin E., and Uriel Rothblum, ‘‘Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets:
In Search of Advice for Participants,’’ Econometrica, 67 (1999), 21–43.
Roth, Alvin E., and Marilda A. O. Sotomayor Two-Sided Matching: A Study in
Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (Cambridge: Econometric Society
Monographs, 1990).
Roth, Alvin E., and John H. Vande Vate, ‘‘Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided
Matching,’’ Econometrica, 58 (1990), 1475–1480.
Roth, Alvin E., and Xiaolin Xing, ‘‘Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions,’’ American
Economic Review, 84 (1994), 992–1044.
———, ‘‘Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized
Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists,’’ Journal of Political
Economy, 105 (1997), 284–329.
Rustichini, Aldo, Mark Satterthwaite, and Steven Williams, ‘‘Convergence to
Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information,’’ Econometrica,
62 (1994), 1041–1064.
So¨nmez, Tayfun, and M. Utku U¨nver, ‘‘Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of
Discrete Resources,’’ in Handbook of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib,
Alberto Bisin, and Matthew Jackson, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009).
———, ‘‘Course Bidding at Business Schools,’’ International Economic Review, 51,
no. 1 (2010), 425–445.
Sotomayor, Marilda A. O., ‘‘Three Remarks on the Many-to-Many Stable
Matching Problem,’’ Mathematical Social Sciences, 38 (1999), 55–70.
MATCHINGWITH COUPLES 47
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
———, ‘‘Implementation in the Many-to-Many Matching Market,’’ Games and
Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 199–212.
Sun, Ning, and Zaifu Yang, ‘‘Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and
Complements,’’ Econometrica, 74 (2006), 1385–1402.
———, ‘‘Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets with Substitutes
and Complements,’’ Econometrica, 77 (2009), 933–952.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS48
 by guest on Septem
ber 7, 2013
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
